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Abstract
The study described in this paper originally aimed at studying the human factors problems of
airborne separation in a Free Flight environment. However, to define the Free Flight
environment with sufficient detail, an overall concept was also designed at NLR. This concept
includes rules-of-the-sky, conflict detection, a conflict resolution algorithm, cockpit displays,
system specification as well as an assessment of operational implications. The feasibility of the
concept has been evaluated in three sub-studies:  (i) off-line traffic simulations with very high
traffic densities and a total of up to 300 aircraft in the incinity, (ii) a safety analysis comparing
the resolution method with current day ATC and (iii) a man-in-the-loop simulator experiment
with line pilots in traffic densities up to three times the average West-European traffic density in
the particular airspace.
None of these studies could refute the feasibility of the achieved Free Flight conceptual design.
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Abbreviations
ACFT Aircraft
AIRSIM Avionics Integration Research SIMulator
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast
AP Auto Pilot
AOC Airline Operations Center
AT Auto Throttle
BADA Base of Aircraft DAta
CGI Computer Generated Image
EFIS Electronic Flight Instument System
EICAS Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System
EPOG Eye Point Of Gaze
FMS Flight Management System
GPWS Ground Proximity Warning System
IFR Instrument Flight Rules
MCP Mode Control Panel
MMI Man Machine Interface
NLR Nationaal Lucht- en Ruimtevaartlaboratorium 
RFS Research Flight Simulator
RTA Required Time of Arrival
RTCA Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics
R/T Radio Telephony
SGI Silicon Graphics
SUA Special Use Airspace
TCAS Traffic alert and Collision Avoidance System
TEM Traffic and Experiment Manager
TFM Traffic Flow Management
TOPAZ Traffic Organization and Perturbation AnalyZer
TTI Time To Intrusion
VFR Visual Flight Rules
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1. Introduction
1.1 General
The following definition (italics) is taken directly from the Report of the Radio Technical
Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) Board of Directors' Select Committee on Free Flight
(Ref 1).
"Free Flight" is defined as :
A safe and efficient flight operating capability under instrument flight rules (IFR) in which the
operators have the freedom to select their path and speed in real time. Air traffic restrictions
are only imposed to ensure separation, to preclude exceeding airport capacity, to prevent
unauthorized flight through special use airspace, and to ensure safety of flight. Restrictions are
limited in extent and duration to correct the identified problem. Any activity which removes
restrictions represents a move towards free flight.
Sometimes the words "Free Flight" are used for concepts, which include direct routing but no
airborne separation. The last sentence of the cursive section is the focus of this study: Free Flight
with Airborne Separation Assurance.
1.2 Airborne Separation Assurance
With present day ATC, traffic is organized in a way that the air traffic controller can easily see
where problems might occur. Figures 1 and 2 show this in a schematic way.
A
B
C
D
      1. Airways                           2. No airways
Fig. 1 and 2: Schematic representation of how airways aid organization of traffic
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Using the airways A, B, C and D and imposing altitude restrictions to the different  airways a
large amount of traffic can be controlled by a single air traffic controller. These airways and
altitude restrictions aid the controller in maintaining a mental model of the situation. However,
these airways and altitude restrictions deny the aircraft the possibility of flying their optimal
route. If each aircraft would fly their optimal route  the picture would look more like figure 2.
Figure 2 shows a much less structured global overview and it is expected that ensuring
separation of all traffic could become problematic for a single controller. This is because the
controller has to identify and resolve for each aircraft the potential conflicts. He then has to solve
all problems without creating new ones. Additionally, he has to do all of this within a short time
span.
own
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16
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18
 own track
Fig. 3 The airborne perspective
The same picture shown from the perspective of an aircraft seems less problematic because it
only has to be deconflicted for the “own” aircraft.
Figure 3 shows the problem as seen from the aircraft named "own" . The first assumption is that
all aircraft can "see" all other aircraft. This means that all aircraft are equipped (e.g. ADS-B and
EFIS traffic display).
When analyzing the picture one can see that out of the 18 aircraft seen in the picture only 4
aircraft might pose a problem in the near future. Only the aircraft numbers 13, 11, 17 and 18
might cross our track at a time that our own aircraft could be in the vicinity (assuming all aircraft
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in this example fly in the same speed range as 'own'). The problem of solving a problem with 4
aircraft is far less than that of solving a situation with 19 aircraft as the air traffic controller must
do when confronted with the overall picture. Not only are there less conflicts there is also only
‘one’ degree of freedom: the intended position of 'own', whereas the air traffic controller has to
'control' all aircraft in the scenario. When provided with conflict detection tools the problem
should be even less complex. Again it is assumed that all aircraft are equipped with conflict
detection and resolution tools. It is assumed that at all times enough space is available to solve
all potentially conflicting traffic. This is based on the fact that airports and their runway capacity
are the limiting factor and that therefore Traffic Flow Management (TFM) will have to provide a
Required Time of Arrival (RTA) for specific points (e.g. metering fixes of CTAS) to ensure
optimal airspace usage and traffic flow. Thus operators can optimize their flight plans with TFM
before and during the flight, but separation responsibility lies with the aircraft. This makes the
long term strategic planning a centrally controlling element integrating all the necessary
information and the short term conflict resolution a distributed controlled element.
This paper will describe the design of the concept of detecting and resolving conflicts during
cruise flight using only airborne systems. Chapter two will discuss the design process itself and
the choices made during the initial design. With off-line computer simulations the different
concepts were tested. During these off-line simulations several different airborne concepts were
tested and the design was frozen. Chapter three describes the design choices made based on
these off-line traffic simulations, especially the chosen resolution algorithm.
Chapter four describes an initial safety study performed on the base-line concept using NLR's
TOPAZ (Traffic Organization and Perturbation AnalyZer) system. Chapter five describes the
follow-on Man-in-the-Loop simulation experiments, in which the human factors issues were
investigated. Finally the overall conclusions and recommendations are described in chapter six.
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2. Initial design
The Free Flight definition used by RTCA only loosely defines the concept. To study a Free
Flight airborne concept a more detailed design was needed. Remaining issues after applying the
RTCA definition are: what is the role & responsibility of ATC, how is an alert zone and
protected zone defined and perhaps most important of all: which resolution method could be
used to ensure a safe and  efficient airborne separation. Based on the goal of this study and the
available literature on Free Flight studies the following choices and assumptions were made:
1) NO ATC
An extreme form of Free Flight was chosen with no air traffic controller on the ground. The idea
behind this concept is to probe the limits of the concept. By first shifting all tasks to the cockpit
to where problems might occur, it will also show where ATC might be needed.
2) ALL AIRCRAFT FULLY EQUIPPED
All aircraft in the scenario are assumed to be fully equipped with ADS-B transmitter & -receiver
and conflict detection & resolution advisory modules. The transmitter sends the aircraft's
position and other information needed by the conflict detection, maybe even intent knowledge,
to all other aircraft. The ADS-B receiver collects all the information of the traffic within a
certain range in the free flight sector.
The scenarios of mixed equipage basically represent the transition to Free Flight and pose
specific problems, which will be addressed in the second phase of the study planned for 1998.
(See also chapter six). For the feasibility  of the concept the far(?) future is studied in which the
transition has taken place.
3) DIRECT ROUTING (horizontally & vertically)
All aircraft use direct routing and cruise climb without steps. So both horizontally and vertically
the flight is 'free'. Considerations for this choice are similar to the NO ATC choice: probing the
limits. It is also one of the benefits of applying Free Flight.
4) UPPER AIRSPACE ONLY
In the first phase the experiment is limited to the upper air space to focus on general conceptual
problems. Somewhere in the descent a transition to controlled flight is foreseen. Where and how
that transition should be implemented is not addressed in the first phase of the study. Highest
gains for direct routing through applying Free Flight are expected in upper airspace, so the
feasibility for this airspace is a worthy result in itself.
5) PROTECTED ZONE
A conflict is defined as an intrusion of the protected zone. The protected zone will be
dimensioned using current ATC standards to be able to relate to existing traffic densities, even
though there are indications the protected zone could be smaller. The definition of protected
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zone & alert zone, as it is used in this concept differs from the RTCA definition mentioned in
chapter 1. The protected zone is the zone never to be entered by any other aircraft. In this
conceptual design the alert zone does not exist in a purely spatial from. There are two aspects of
the alert zone: interrogation & alerting. The interrogation is limited to a (large) maximum
number of aircraft and within a certain (large) range. These limits are rarely limiting the airborne
separation function when chosen large enough. (Limits used in this study are: a range of 100 -
200 nautical mile, maximum number 300 aircraft for system, 100 aircraft for traffic display) The
alerting of a detected conflict is limited by the look-ahead time. This look-ahead time is the
maximum time-to-intrusion for which a conflict is detected. This look-ahead time could be
regarded as a time-based implementation of the alert zone and has been determined in the off-
line traffic simulations.
Fig. 4 Protected zone dimensions (vertical scale exaggerated)
The task of the conflict detection module is to predict an intrusion of the protected zone. This
protected zone was chosen to reflect current ATC separation standards: 5 nautical mile radius
and a height of 2000 feet (altitude-1000ft to altitude+1000 ft, see also fig. 4) This means the
ratio diameter to height is about 30 to 1. This zone is often referred to as the "hockey puck" but
the shape is actually flatter than most coins.
6) 
 RULES-OF-THE-SKY & CONFLICT RESOLUTION ADVISORIES
From the start in this study it was assumed a resolution advisory system, comparable to TCAS, is
necessary for two reasons: implementing the rules-of-the-sky in the system forms a common
element in the system, which aids a consistent overall system behavior, and to ensure the
workload of the crew stays within acceptable limits.
This is a feature sometimes not foreseen in the concept of airborne separation.
This obviously has a great impact on the workload introduced in the cockpit and therefore is
seen as critical by the author for the acceptability of the concept by the pilots community.
For the rules-of-the-sky no clear choice had been made yet. A thorough study of other free flight
studies and ATM studies yielded a number of possibilities for the resolution method (Ref. 9, 10).
No clear indication was found of the relative value of these methods. Therefore it was concluded
that off-line traffic simulations were needed to compare the different resolution methods for the
experiment.
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3. Off-line traffic simulations
3.1 Traffic & Experiment manager (TEM)
From earlier experiments a rudimentary real-time, six degrees-of-freedom traffic simulator was
available. This traffic simulator could simulate 10 aircraft following prescribed instructions. It
was used to simulate traffic around the Research Flight Simulator (RFS). For this study this
traffic simulator was enhanced with a graphical user interface, optimized to be able to simulate
400 aircraft simultaneously, enhanced with BADA performance models (Ref.  6) and fitted with
pilot models able to follow a flight plan and detect and resolve conflicts. The program includes
the European navigation data and airports. Scheduling take-offs at airports and airspace entries
at the border of the area enables automatic generation of realistic Free Flight traffic patterns over
Europe.
This program has also been used for the man-in-the-loop simulator experiments to simulate a
realistic traffic environment and control the experiment scenario. (see chapter five)
The traffic manager program has a modular structure. A collection of modules are driven by
commands derived from an internal command stack. This command stack is supplied with
commands from various sources: the command edit window, a playback file and mouse buttons.
Next to the event driven part of the program there is a time scheduled part: the aircraft models,
pilot models, automatic scenario generation functions and conflict detection.
The recording option enables the recording of commands to generate the scenario playback files.
These scenario files were used for both the off-line comparison of the different resolution
methods as well as for the man-in-the-loop simulator experiments.
Fig. 5 Traffic & Experiment Manager
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The scenario files provided the research flight simulator crew with traffic backgrounds of up to
three times the Western-European traffic densities, as well as preprogrammed conflicting traffic
on their route to increase the number of conflicts met during the twenty minute flight with
another factor of at least three.
See also chapter 5 on the man-in-the-loop simulations for a description of the fidelity of the
models and on-line application of the traffic & experiment manager
3.2 Conflict detection
For the conflict detection three levels of intent were foreseen: (i) no intent information (ii) mode
control panel (tactical) information (iii) route information.
However due to the more efficient usage of the sky when flying direct routes and optimal
altitude the number of conflicts (defined as an intrusion of protected zone, not a mid-air
collision) already was very low when no conflict avoiding action was undertaken. Therefore the
required avoidance maneuvers are so rare, that most flights are very predictable using current
trend information alone. The accuracy of the prediction rarely changes when using track angle
(no intent) instead of using route information (destination or next waypoint), because basically
most of the times the intended route is the current track when flying direct routes. Especially
with a typical look-ahead time of five minutes, increasing the level of intent hardly improves the
quality of the predictions. This notion was confirmed by the first off-line traffic simulation trials
where the conflict detection & resolution already proved to be very effective without using any
intent information. This of course would be different in the current ATC controlled situation
where the airways might introduce sudden turns when passing a waypoint or where an altitude
clearance introduces a sudden climb or descent.
To drop the requirement for intent information has huge advantages: conflict detection becomes
more transparent to the pilots, reduced bandwidth of required communication, no need to solve
issues concerning source and validity of intent information (FMS, MCP, separate devices), less
modifications to the cockpit. Therefore it was concluded it would be interesting to try whether
the concept was feasible without using intent knowledge in the conflict detection module.
The conflict detection module now only has to look at the current state (position and altitude)
and trend vector (ground speed, track, and vertical speed) to predict a conflict. Using vector
calculations the predicted minimum distance with other traffic is calculated. When less than the
required separation and if the time of intrusion is within the look-ahead time, it is stored in the
conflict database, together with time of intrusion, predicted positions of both own and other
aircraft. This information is presented to the crew on the navigation display graphically, triggers
an aural alert and is also passed on to the resolution module.
Note that when an airborne conflict detection module performs the conflict detection, each
future conflict is detected twice (by both aircraft) and this means the conflict will still be
detected when one of the conflict detection modules fails.
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A conflict is defined as a minimum distance in time-space, which is less than the required
minimum separation distance. The conflict detection module only detects conflicts with aircraft
for which the intrusion of the protected zone takes place in the near future. After several
simulations with varying traffic densities this so-called look-ahead time was set at five minutes.
3.3 Resolution methods
In the off-line study using the traffic manager, several methods for traffic resolution have been
considered: (i) altitude step, (ii) a cross product of speed vectors (iii) extended VFR rules
(iv)variations on TCAS maneuvers and (v) different implementations of the so-called voltage
potential.
(i) 
 ALTITUDE STEP & (iv) TCAS MANEUVERS
The altitude step  calculates a required altitude to arrive on before the conflict occurs. By
climbing or descending the conflict is resolved. Via automatic negotiation it is resolved which
aircraft maneuvers in which direction. This is similar to the TCAS III maneuvers. Advantages of
these methods are the effective maneuver, because of the shape of the protected zone (see
chapter two). It also prevents large deviations from the route. Disadvantages of this method are
the need for communication, which also requires extra hardware or sharing the same device as
the TCAS module, and extra bandwidth. On top of that there is a clear lack of transparency: the
pilot is out of the loop, event thought the look-ahead time of several minutes permits active
decision making by the crew. The vertical maneuver may also not always be the most cost/time
effective maneuver.
(ii) 
 CROSS PRODUCT OF SPEED VECTORS
This resolution method is based on the cross product of the two vectors i.e. aircraft speed
vectors. The resolution method uses the non-commutative property of a cross-product combined
with the result of the product to establish the direction of the adjustment in the aircraft's speed
vector. Considering two speed-vectors for aircraft A and B respectively va and vb,  the non-
commutative property is the following: (va × vb = - ( va × vb)). The effect of this is that both
aircraft will maneuver co-operatively to prevent the conflict. The result of the cross product is a
vector perpendicular to the plane defined by the aircraft's speed-vectors. This ensures an
effective and clear resolution for all vertical and horizontal characteristics of the geometry of a
predicted conflict. Of course there are singularities, where the cross product becomes zero: the
exact head-on or exact head-tail conflict, which were covered separately to ensure an opposite
sign of the avoidance maneuver for the aircraft involved.
The magnitude of the heading, vertical speed and /or speed adjustments depends on the
distances from the aircraft to the predicted point of conflict, the size of the protected zones and
the current airspeeds and not on the result of the cross product.
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An advantage of this method is the co-operative maneuver and the transparency to the pilot. A
disadvantage is that it does not always yield the most cost-effective solution to a conflict.
(iv) EXTENDED VFR RULES
These rules basically use VFR-like system to judge, who has right of way. Eurocontrol
Experiment Center has looked in to this set of rules and constructed some variations, which does
not only take into account the direction the other aircraft is coming from but also the current
flight phase (climb, final climb, cruise, initial descent, descent) to judge which aircraft has right
of way. There still is a certain freedom to choose the maneuver to avoid the aircraft. This
complicates the automatic calculation of a resolution advisory. It needs an extra algorithm to
decide upon the resolution maneuver. Therefore it was concluded this method could not be used
on its own in an automatic resolution advisory system. Another disadvantage of the system is the
concept of only one aircraft maneuvering to avoid the conflict A typical human response of the
crew who has right of way, is to still avoid the conflict instead of waiting for the other aircraft to
maneuver. This is similar to behavior of car traffic in cases where the right-of-way rule is not
very obvious.
(v) VOLTAGE POTENTIAL LIKE
The voltage potential is an analogy, which compares traffic with electrically charged particles.
Suppose all aircraft would be regarded as positively charged particles and the destination would
be negatively charged. Summing all the repulsive forces of the traffic and the attracting force of
the destination is a way to determine a vector, which maintains separation with other aircraft and
will bring the aircraft to its destination. See figure 6.
Fig. 6 Simplistic view of voltage potential
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This resolution method is much too simplistic to be used in free flight. For example no minimum
separation is guaranteed and attraction to destination varies with distance to destination. It is
also quite impractical to sum the repulsive forces of all aircraft even the ones with which no
conflict currently is predicted.
Fig. 7 Geometry of resolution method
At the Lincoln Laboratory (MIT, MA, USA) an algorithm has been developed which retains the
basic repulsion feature of the voltage potential but has a more pragmatic approach to solving
conflicts (see fig. 7). This method has been slightly modified for use in the resolution module.
When a predicted conflict with traffic has been detected by the conflict detection module, the
resolution module uses the predicted future position of both aircraft (will be called ownship) and
the traffic or obstacle aircraft (will be called intruder) at the moment of minimum distance. The
minimum distance vector is the vector from the predicted position of the intruder to the
predicted position of the own ship. The avoidance vector is calculated as the vector starting at
the future position of the own ship and ending at the edge of the intruder's protected zone, in the
direction of the minimum distance vector. The length of the avoidance vector is the amount of
intrusion of the own ship in the intruder's protected zone and reflects the severity of our conflict.
It is also the shortest way out of the protected zone. Therefore the own ship should try to
accomplish this displacement in the time left till the conflict. Dividing the avoidance vector by
the time left yields a speed vector which should be summed to the current speed vector to
determine the advised speed vector. The result is an advised track and a ground speed. Using the
three-dimensional vector also an advised vertical speed is calculated. In case of multiple
conflicts within the look-ahead time, the avoidance vectors are summed.
Each resolution method has its singularities in which the avoidance vector becomes zero or the
sign can not be determined. Though this could be regarded as a theoretical problem, since in
reality noise will prevent these singularities to last long, numerical techniques like integer
calculations or limited resolution in numbers could make it happen. This resolution method is no
exception to the rule and several provisions are made to solve the singularities. For example in
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case of an exact head-on collision course on the same altitude with no vertical speed, both
aircraft will be advised to turn right.
This resolution method assumes the intruder does not maneuver to avoid the conflict. This is
part of the fail safe principle of the concept. Normally the intruder will also maneuver. Using the
same principle will always result in an avoidance vector in the opposite direction because of the
geometry of the conflict (compare the future positions with the charged particles). Therefore an
effective co-operation is achieved without negotiation or additional communication. This also
means the initially calculated advised heading and/or speed changes will normally not be
required. As soon as the conflict disappears, the current heading, speed and/or vertical speed can
be maintained. This means both aircraft 'suffer' equally due to the conflict.
Both aircraft can choose whether they solve the conflict horizontally or vertically and they
initially calculate the resolution advisory as if the other aircraft does not avoid the conflict. This
means a total of four maneuvers are available, which all are able to solve the conflict
independently. Performance limits, weather, restricted airspace will sometimes inhibit one or
two maneuvers but rarely or almost never all four. When this would happen, the backup modes
like TCAS could become critical or the crew monitoring the situation could via R/T negotiate an
acceptable solution. Using a look-ahead time of five minutes ensures there is time enough to
identify the problem and solve it.
FINAL CHOICE: MODIFIED VOLTAGE POTENTIAL
In the off-line study using the traffic manager several methods for traffic resolution have been
implemented: the TCAS like altitude step, a cross product of speed vectors and two different
implementations of the voltage potential (one specially modified to maneuver without speed
changes). Several were implemented and proved to be effective. Looking at route efficiency,
time efficiency, fuel efficiency and other practical aspects related to displaying and executing the
resolutions, the modified voltage potential method as described by Martin Eby (Ref. 3) was
chosen for the man-in-the-loop experiment. One modification on the description of Eby is that
no longer the intended route is used to predict a conflict but rather the currently expected track
based on current trend information.
3.4 System aspects
In figure 8 an overview of the involved airborne systems is shown. When the conflicting traffic
is also fully equipped this means two independent decision-making loops exist to solve the
conflict. Therefore the ADS-B transmitter and receiver should be completely independent to
separate the two decision-making loops.
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Fig. 8 System lay-out of conflict detection and resolution
Apart from all the fail-safe aspects of conflict detection and resolution, TCAS is assumed to be
present as a last minute backup. Also an inter-traffic R/T frequency is available, which can serve
to identify possible problems.
Because all aircraft initially maneuver as if the other aircraft will not avoid the conflict, it is
tempting to stay at the route and optimal altitude and let the other aircraft solve all conflicts.
Therefore an arbitration function is foreseen using a ground based monitoring system, which
signals abnormal behavior in conflict solving. A fining or sanction system could be used to
prevent this non-co-operative behavior.
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4. Safety analysis
NLR's ATM department has performed an ATM safety analysis of the Free Flight concept, as
described in the conceptual design sections two and three. The analysis concerns collision risk
calculation for aircraft that follow parallel tracks of opposite direction.
The scenario considered, consists of two parallel routes of opposite direction and at a single
flight level. Obviously using user preferred routing (horizontally and vertically) would decrease
the collision risk significantly from the onset (Ref. 8).
Further assumptions made were:
 -  TCAS and voice R/T not operational
 -  In all circumstances, the aircraft will try to follow the resolution advisory provided by the
system.
-  Only conflicts of two aircraft are considered
-  Weather is good
-  Level of maintenance is always good
-  ADS-B reception and transmission are independent
- ADS-B, global is always functioning
- No vertical resolution maneuvers were considered
Sources for non-nominal conditions were:
- Aircraft flight-plan differs from route
- Aircraft system failures
- Aircraft navigation support failures.
Broadly speaking, two steps were taken during the safety analysis of this scenario.
Firstly scenarios that comprise safety critical events were identified and their probability of
occurrence was determined. This included a Hazard Identification brainstorm session, held at
NLR. Also a high-level probabilistic model of the ATM scenario was developed. This model
includes the occurrence of the identified events that compromise safety (e.g. ADS-B equipment
not working) and the aircraft trajectories (including conflict resolution and stochastic deviations
from the intended flight path).
Secondly the model was evaluated with respect to collision risk. This was done through the use
of NLR's TOPAZ (Traffic Organization and Perturbation AnalyZer) (Ref. 7), a purpose-built
platform that supports Monte Carlo simulations and numerical analysis of the previously
developed model, for the evaluation of the frequency of occurrence of the identified scenarios
and for the assessment of the corresponding collision risks.
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Collision risk was calculated for each scenario, giving a clearer view of the impact of the
concept on ATM safety.  How does this compare with present day ATC? Drawing the resulting
collision risk line for Free Flight in the same figure for ATC results in the figure below.
Fig. 9 Comparison safety of scenario for Free Flight and present day ATC
The horizontal line (TLS) shows a target level of safety as set for reference for the year 2000 by
ICAO.
From these analyses the following conclusions can be drawn under the model assumptions
made:
 -The largest safety benefit will be achieved by dealing with the nominal/non-nominal
contribution.
  -Free Flight with airborne separation assurance is feasible in comparison to STCA based ATC
(Ref. 4)..
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5. Man-in-the-loop experiment
Finally Man-in-the-Loop simulation experiments were conducted. The purpose was to identify
the human factor issues concerned with the above-mentioned concept.
5.1 Simulation facilities
The Free Flight experiments were conducted using three main components: NLR's Traffic and
Experiment Manager (TEM), NLR's Research Flight Simulator (RFS) and NLR's Avionics
Integration Research SIMulator (AIRSIM).
5.1.1 Traffic and Experiment Manager (TEM)
The Traffic and Experiment Manager (TEM) has already been mentioned in chapter 2, in the
section on the off-line traffic simulations. It  was also developed for simulating traffic around the
RFS in a Free Flight scenario. Both automatic and interactively controlled traffic can be
generated by the TEM. This traffic around the RFS is simulated using 6 degree of freedom
aircraft models (using BADA, ref. 6) containing autopilot and auto throttle functionality, flight
planning functionality and a pilot model. The Traffic and Experiment Manager contains all
conflict detection and resolution algorithms as described in chapter 2, for all aircraft in the TEM,
including the RFS.
The pilot model includes delayed reaction to conflict resolution advisories and delayed resuming
navigation to the aircraft's destination once a conflict is solved. The resolution advisories from
the conflict detection and resolution algorithms are taken over by the pilot models, thus
controlling the autopilot to resolve the conflict.
During the experiment the TEM was connected to the Research Flight Simulator (RFS) which
was one of the aircraft in the TEM. The TEM was also connected to AIRSIM (a workstation
based desktop simulator). AIRSIM could take over control of any aircraft in the Free Flight
scenario and give back control of the aircraft to the TEM. Events in the experiment were
generated from the TEM.
Radio communication was also simulated during the experiment, thus providing R/T
background consistent with the traffic situation.
5.1.2 Research Flight Simulator (RFS)
The Research Flight Simulator (RFS) consists of a side-by-side transport cockpit, based on a 4
degrees-of-freedom, low friction motion system. The cockpit of the Research Flight Simulator is
a full glass cockpit with a layout common for modern aircraft, see figure 10. The Research Flight
Simulator has a modular and flexible set up both in hardware and software, to be able to
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simulate a range of aircraft types. The simulator configuration used for the Free Flight
experiments was the Boeing 747-400 configuration.
Fig. 10 NLR's Research Flight Simulator.
5.1.3 Avionics Integration Research SIMulator (AIRSIM)
Non-nominal events were necessary during the experiment. As the aircraft in the TEM were
automatically controlled in the Free Flight scenario, AIRSIM was used to control the aircraft in a
non-nominal way.
AIRSIM is a highly configurable and flexible desktop flight simulator with the same
functionality as the RFS, using largely identical software. AIRSIM runs on one or two SGI
workstations and is interactively controllable with keyboard and mouse.
(See also paper/presentation AIAA-98-4370)
5.2 Man Machine Interface (MMI) description
The MMI-adaptations in the cockpit for the Free Flight environment consisted of:
1)  Modified Navigation display (incl. vertical display and traffic & conflict symbology)
2) Aural alerting of conflicts
3) Modified EFIS Control Panel used for controlling and decluttering extra information on
navigation display
4) Modifications to the Autopilot for (semi-) automatically flying the traffic resolution.
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The traffic was displayed on the Navigation Display like TCAS displays traffic today. Because
of the expected relative importance of vertical maneuvers a Vertical Navigation display was
integrated below the normal horizontal Navigation Display. In contrast with a normal TCAS
display, different symbology was used because of the extra available information.
Fig. 11 Navigation display with traffic symbology
The extra information consisted of:
Traffic and own ship information:
• Traffic call sign
• Track direction
• Altitude
• Ground speed
• Vertical speed direction (arrow)
• Vertical and horizontal track of own aircraft
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 Conflict info
•
 
Protected zone around predicted position of intruder at minimum distance
•
 
Predicted track-line of the intruder, which connects the intruder with the conflict symbol
indicating the predicted position of the intruder.
•
 
Time to intrusion
 
 Resolution to prevent intrusion by means of:
•
 
Graphical coplanar avoidance -vector
•
 
Steering bugs on Nav Display and PFD
When a conflict occurred with a time to intrusion of less than 5 minutes, the following sequence
of display changes were shown:
1- The position of traffic  (in amber);
2- The incursion of the protected zone of  the traffic;
3- The traffic resolution;
4- After a conflict had been resolved the traffic symbol would remain in the conflict color
(amber or red) for 10 seconds to help pilots identify the conflicting aircraft.
If during the above sequence the time to maximum intrusion became less than 3 minutes, the
traffic symbols were shown in red together with a more urgent aural alerting level. Figure 11
shows the Navigation display with the traffic symbols.
5.3 Experimental scenario
It was required to have three levels of density: single, double and triple density i.e. ones, twice
and three times the "normal" density in European airspace. The experimental runs would last 20
minutes and the Free Flight scenarios should be as realistic as is possible.
To have realistic scenarios, automatic scenario generation was created within the TEM, which
resulted in continuously departing and arriving traffic from and to airports, using direct routes
from origin to destination. Low and high altitude airports were defined. Low altitude airports
simulate real airports, while high altitude generate en-route traffic leaving or entering the
experiment area.
The origin of every aircraft was randomly taken from a list of  9 low and 9 high altitude airports
around the experimental area and the destination of every aircraft was also taken randomly from
this same list.
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Fig. 12 TEM screen with typical traffic scenario
In this way eighteen realistic sets of single density scenarios were developed. By summing
different single density scenarios the double and triple density scenarios were obtained. To make
sure the RFS would be in conflict with other aircraft, specific conflicts were added to the
scenarios. Figure 12 shows the screen of the TEM with a typical traffic scenario.
A small part of an FMS company route from Glasgow to Athens, lasting 20 minutes, was flown
during each experimental run.
5.4 Experiment matrix
Eight crews were tested during four weeks in September and October 1997.
Three levels of traffic load and three levels of resolution activation were used making a total of
nine experimental cells. Resolution activation was varied between three levels:
1) Manual, in which case the crew had to enter MCP entries themselves.
2) Execute separate, in which case the crew could choose to auto enter either the horizontal, or
the vertical maneuver or both by pressing one or two buttons on the MCP.
3) Execute combined, in which case the crew could auto enter the complete maneuver by
pressing a button on the MCP.
These nine conditions were flown in a nominal (everything works as advertised) and in a non-
nominal way making a total of 18 experimental cells. The non-nominal scenarios included
events in which malfunctions and distracters were simulating one out of three main mishaps:
1) Anti collision system of other aircraft fails;
2) Anti collision system of own aircraft fails;
3) Delay times of system is increased
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5.5 Results
None of the experimental runs resulted in a loss of separation, except for the non-nominal runs
in which loss of separation was forced upon the RFS by the TEM/AIRSIM.
5.5.1 Acceptability of Free Flight with airborne separation assurance
The subjective ratings of acceptability were scored on scales from 1 to 5 indicating respectively
5 = "Perfect in every way"
4 = "Favorable"
3 = "Acceptable"
2 = "Unacceptable"
1 = "Completely unacceptable"
Fig. 13 Subjective acceptability rating
Figure 13 shows the acceptability rating overall, during nominal runs and during non-nominal
runs. In all three cases the average rating was above 3, indicating acceptable or better.
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5.5.2 Subjective Safety compared with present day ATC
The subjective ratings of  safety were scored on scales from 1 to 5 indicating respectively
5 = "FF much safer"
4 = "FF safer"
3 = "same as ATC"
2 = "ATC safer"
1 = "ATC much safer"
Fig. 14 Subjective safety rating
Figure 15 shows the safety rating overall, during nominal runs and during non-nominal runs. In
all three cases the average rating was above 3, indicating same as ATC or better.
5.5.3 Subjective mental workload
The subjective workload ratings on a scale from 0-150 during the experiment are shown in
figure 15 for single, double and triple traffic densities as well as for nominal and non nominal
cases. All average ratings are at or below the 40 mark, indicating that crews rate this concept as
"costing some effort" or less.
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Fig. 15 Subjective workload rating
During other simulator experiments under normal cruise conditions the average rating would be
27.
-28-
NLR-TP-98252
6. Conclusion & remaining issues
6.1 Conclusion
None of the three sub-studies (off-line simulations, TOPAZ safety analysis, and Man-in-the-
Loop experiment) could refute the feasibility of the conceptual design of Free Flight as defined
in chapter two.
6.2 Issues
During the experiments comments and actions of the subject crews were noted.  The major
issues for improvement of the concept were derived from comments repeated consistently by all
crews:
• Some form of obtaining intent information should be made available. This should NOT be
used by the conflict detection module!
• Aircraft which are in trouble should be able to broadcast a signal upon which they would
receive priority with conflicts.
• An extra rule forbidding large horizontal and/or vertical maneuvers resulting in conflicts
less then 5 minutes away should be added. (This would require a form of prediction
capability of the conflict detection module in relation to possible future maneuvers)
• Passenger comfort is a major issue, which has to be resolved in relation to vertical
maneuvers.
• At cruise altitudes the limited speed regime of most aircraft excludes large speed changes
as a resolution possibility.
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